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FARMER COOPERATIVES “TAKE COVER”: 




 & Jay L. Levine
**
 
“When tillage begins, other arts follow.  The farmers, therefore, 
are the founders of human civilization.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION
There can be little dispute that food production is of vital 
interest to any nation’s security and economy.  For this reason, 
the United States Congress, like many other legislatures around 
the world, has accorded special treatment to the agricultural 
industry, and particularly to farmers.  One example of this special 
treatment is the Capper-Volstead Act, which provides farmers 
with immunity from antitrust liability for joint conduct 
undertaken by and through an “association” of producers.
2
   
* Donald M. Barnes is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Porter Wright Morris
& Arthur and is the Co-Chair of the Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law Practice Group. 
Mr. Barnes is currently Chair of the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives’ Antitrust 
Subcommittee. He is a 1970 cum laude graduate of the George Washington University 
School of Law where he served as Notes Editor of the Law Review and is a member of the 
order of the Coif. His practice is concentrated in antitrust/trade regulation law, agricultural 
cooperative law, and complex antitrust and commercial litigation.  
** Jay L. Levine is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Porter Wright Morris & 
Arthur and is the Co-Chair of the Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law Practice Group. 
Mr. Levine is a past Vice-Chair of the ABA Antitrust Section’s Joint Conduct Committee. 
He is a 1990 cum laude graduate of Fordham University School of Law where he served as 
a member of the Law Review. His practice is concentrated in antitrust and consumer 
protection, with a particular emphasis on the agriculture and food industries, and general 
complex litigation.  
1. DANIEL WEBSTER, REMARKS ON AGRICULTURE, Jan. 13, 1840.
2. 7 U.S.C. § 291.  Introduced by Senator Arthur Capper (R) Kansas and
Representative Andrew Volstead (R) Minnesota.  William Richard Tillman, The Legislative 
History of the Capper-Volstead Act 42 (1930) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of 
Kansas) (on file with the University of Kansas).  An “agricultural cooperative” is simply an 
association of agricultural producers—”farmers”—and thus the term is used interchangeably 
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As the country transformed itself from an agrarian economy 
to a more industrialized and urban economy, an imbalance in 
bargaining power grew between farmers, on the one hand, and 
their customers—processors or distributors (e.g., large 
supermarkets)—on the other.
3
  Farmers were at risk of going 
bankrupt or being forced to sell their land.
4
  This untenable 
situation imperiled the nation’s food supply and risked raising 
consumer prices for food staples to unacceptable levels.
5
  Enacted 
in 1922, the Capper-Volstead Act was intended to correct this 
power imbalance by allowing farmers to associate with each other 
and collectively market their products.
6
  Indeed, because some of 
the more essential functions of agricultural cooperatives implicate 
the antitrust laws, the Capper-Volstead Act has been key to 
allowing farmers to achieve their objectives, and has even been 
referred to as the “Magna Carta” of agricultural cooperatives.
7
 
Notwithstanding the historical centrality of the Capper-
Volstead Act to the efficient functioning of agricultural 
cooperatives, the protections afforded by the Act have been under 
increasing attack in private antitrust litigation.  In recent years, 
class actions have been filed against mushroom, potato, egg, and 
dairy farmers, and their cooperatives.
8
  In addition, many 
middlemen, including large supermarkets and other power 
buyers, have opted out of these classes and chosen to bring their 
own actions.  These “opt out” plaintiffs include some of the 
with “farmer cooperative.”  Agricultural Cooperative, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, 
[https://perma.cc/HD49-4UEZ] (last visited Jan. 20, 2021). 
3. Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 825-26 (1978); Nat’l
Broiler Mktg. Ass’n, 436 U.S. at 830 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
4. Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n, 436 U.S. at 830 (Brennan, J., concurring).
5. See DONALD A. FREDERICK, ANTITRUST STATUS OF FARMER COOPERATIVES: THE
STORY OF THE CAPPER-VOLSTEAD ACT 63, 66 (2002). 
6. See Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n, 436 U.S. at 824-26.
7. EWELL PAUL ROY, COOPERATIVES: TODAY AND TOMORROW 215-216 (2d ed.
1969). 
8. See generally In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 621 F. Supp. 2d
274 (E.D. Pa. 2009); In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 867 (E.D. 
Pa. 2012); In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Idaho 
2011) (recently settled); Edwards v. Nat’l Milk Producers Fed’n, No. C 11-04766 JSW, 2014 
WL 4643639 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2014) (recently settled).  In the interest of full disclosure, 
Mr. Barnes is counsel of record in In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig, and both 
Mr. Barnes and Mr. Levine are lead counsel for one of the largest defendants in In re 
Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig.  
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largest supermarket chains in the world—the very type of “power 
buyer” middlemen whose disproportionate bargaining leverage 
motivated Congress to enhance and protect the collective 
bargaining power of farmers by passage of the Capper-Volstead 
Act.
9
  Each of these antitrust cases involve conduct that, arguably, 
is immune under the Capper-Volstead Act.
10
  Yet, the plaintiffs 
in these actions challenge the application of the Capper-Volstead 
Act and raise issues that go to the heart of the antitrust exemption, 
potentially exposing thousands of agricultural cooperatives and 
their members to crippling damages awards. 
While the Capper-Volstead Act is often referred to as 
arcane,
11
 the number of antitrust suits filed in the past ten to 
fifteen years against farmers and their cooperatives have 
engendered more scrutiny of this legislation than at any other time 
in the past.  This Article endeavors to explain the current issues 
facing the Capper-Volstead Act and the potential consequences 
of judicial decisions that rob it of its effectiveness.  We begin with 
a description of the key cooperative antitrust exemption statutes 
and their origins, and then proceed to address the pending legal 
challenges and the threats they pose to the exemption and to 
cooperatives and farmers themselves.
12
  We also consider 




9. Bridget Goldschmidt, Grocers’ Claims Rejected in Egg Antitrust Case (Dec. 13,
2019), [https://perma.cc/R5CS-RML7]; A.S. Klein, Annotation, Monopolies: construction 
of § 1 of the Capper-Volstead Act (7 U.S.C.A § 291) authorizing persons engaged in the 
production of agricultural products to act together in associations, 20 A.L.R. Fed. 924 
(1974). 
10. See In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 621 F. Supp. 2d at 278-79;
In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d at 877; In re Fresh & Process 
Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d at 1148-49; Edwards, 2014 WL 4643639, at *1. 
11. Transcript of Oral Argument at 268, In re Processed Eggs Prod. Antitrust Litig.,
No. 08-md-2002 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
12. See infra Parts II-IV.
13. See infra Part V.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAPPER-VOLSTEAD
ACT 
A. The Years Leading Up to 1922
One hundred years after Samuel Slater opened the first 
industrial mill in the United States, which was widely credited as 
the beginning of the American industrial revolution, Congress 
passed the Sherman Act in 1890.
14
  At the time, there was intense 
public opposition to the concentration of economic power in large 
corporations.
15
  Farmers in particular complained because of the 
high prices they were charged for transporting their products to 
the cities by railroad.
16
  Large industrial trusts were seen as 
stifling competition and causing prices to increase even higher.
17
  
Thus, Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to engage 
in concerted conduct “in restraint of trade.”
18
 
Partly as a response to the industrial revolution, which 
caused many farmers to leave their land in search of work in the 
cities, the concept of agricultural cooperatives took hold in 
Europe in the late 1700s.
19
  Cooperatives allowed small, 
independent farmers to pool their resources and become more 
efficient.
20
  By the 1800s, the concept of a cooperative took hold 
in the United States and became prominent in the agricultural 
sector.
21
  The American Farm Bureau and the National Farmers 
Union emerged as strong promoters of agricultural cooperatives 
in the early 1900s by providing technical assistance to new 
cooperatives, and by lobbying for the enactment of state and 
14. Deborah A. Ballam, The Evolution of the Government-Business Relationship in the
United States: Colonial Times to Present, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 553, 580 n.109, 612 (1994). 
15. FREDERICK, supra note 5, at 22.
16. Id. at 9.
17. 21 CONG. REC. 2461 (Mar. 21, 1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, is declared to be illegal.”). 
19. See History of Co-ops, CO+OP, WELCOME TO THE TABLE, [https://perma.cc/ZE2L-
CDS5](last visited Jan. 22, 2021). 
20. See id.
21. FREDRICK., supra note 5, at 9-10, 19-21.
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federal legislation favorable to cooperatives.
22
  And as 
cooperatives continued to grow, they were being sued for 
violations of the Sherman Act, the very statute that many of them 
hoped would bring them relief from the railroad trusts.
23
  For 
example, dairy farmer associations grew quickly in the early 
1900s as they assisted their members by setting a minimum price 
for their members’ products.  But, they faced several antitrust 
actions, which discouraged future membership.
24
  
The reach of the Sherman Act was quite broad and 
prohibited conduct that Congress did not wish to condemn.  Thus, 
in 1914, Congress enacted the Clayton Act.
25
  Of relevance here, 
Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides: 
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to 
forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or 
horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of 
mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for 
profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such 
organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate 
objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the 
members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal 
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the 
antitrust laws.26  
Section 6 of the Clayton Act recognized the unique problems 
facing farmers and cooperatives, along with their counterparts in 
the workforce, namely workers and their labor unions.
27
  Each 
group faced an enormous imbalance in bargaining power when 
facing grocery retailers and employers, respectively, but each 
were prohibited by the Sherman Act from joining together to gain 
any leverage.  Section 6 sought to correct that situation by treating 
all members of the association as being part of a single 
organization and therefore incapable of conspiring under Section 
22. See History, American Farm Bureau Federation, [https://perma.cc/W393-
TBP2](last visited Jan. 22, 2021); History, National Farmers Union, 
[https://perma.cc/3DY3-DS8G](last visited Jan. 22, 2021). 
23. See FREDERICK, supra note 5, at 62, 69-70, 74.
24. Id. at 61-62.
25. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (emphasis added).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 17.
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1 of the Sherman Act, thus becoming the original legislative 
foundation for the agricultural cooperative antitrust exemption.
28
  
But the language of Section 6 posed another problem.  By its 
terms, it only applied to cooperatives that did not issue capital 
stock.
29  Indeed, raisin grape growers, under threat of prosecution 
from the Department of Justice, entered into a consent decree just 
a month before the Capper-Volstead Act was passed.
30
  
Previously, the Federal Trade Commission had reported that 
Section 6 of the Clayton Act did not apply to the current structure 
of the raisin growers’ association because it had capital stock.
31
 
B. The Passage of the Capper-Volstead Act
The fact that the antitrust protections contained in Section 6 
were limited to non-stock cooperatives proved to be a real 
problem.  Congress believed that extending protection to 
cooperatives that issued stock would increase farmers’ incentive 
to unite and enhance their economic strength.
32
  An extension of 
the protection was necessary because farmers were continuing to 
be at a severe disadvantage in the marketplace.  Not only were 
they subject to the whims of Mother Nature, but they were also at 
the mercy of processors and distributors who could dictate terms 
of sale.
33
  This was especially disadvantageous for the farmers 
dealing in perishable commodities.
34
   
Thus, the Capper-Volstead Act was enacted in 1922 to 
clarify and expand the exemption in Section 6 of the Clayton Act 
and to include cooperatives with capital stock: 
Persons engaged in the production of agricultural products 
as farmers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit 
growers may act together in associations, corporate or 
otherwise, with or without capital stock, in collectively 
processing, preparing for market, handling, and marketing in 
28. Note, Trust Busting down on the Farm: Narrowing the Scope of Antitrust
Exemptions for Agricultural Cooperatives, 61 VA. L. REV. 341, 352-56 (1975). 
29. 15 U.S.C. § 17.
30. FREDERICK, supra note 5 at 62-63, 66.
31. See id. at 65-66.
32. Id. at 94-100, 102-03.
33. See id. at 91.
34. 62 CONG. REC. 2123 (1922) (statement of Sen. Walsh).
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interstate and foreign commerce, such products of persons 
so engaged.  Such associations may have marketing agencies 
in common; and such associations and their members may 
make the necessary contracts and agreements to effect such 
purposes . . . .35 
The expanded exemption spelled out certain structural 
requirements that a farmer cooperative had to meet before it was 
entitled to antitrust immunity.  Specifically, it required that the 
association must be “operated for the mutual benefit of the 
members . . . as . . . producers . . . .”
36
  Second, each member may 
have only one vote, or the cooperative must limit dividends on 
capital stock to eight percent per annum.
37
  Third, the cooperative 
cannot deal in non-member products in an amount greater in value 
than the products of members.
38
  
The Act expressly exempted the “collective[] processing, 
preparing for market, handling, and marketing” of agricultural 
products.
39
  Judicial decisions have interpreted the Capper-
Volstead Act to include the ability to fix prices,
40








and include foreign members in domestic cooperatives.
44
 
35. 7 U.S.C. § 291.  Interestingly, the Act references associations not cooperatives.
Indeed, no formal corporate structure is mandated by the Act.  Nevertheless, the two have 
become synonymous because agricultural associations that wish to avail themselves of 
Capper-Volstead Act protections have typically organized themselves into cooperatives.   
36. 7 U.S.C. § 291.  Throughout this article, the term “farmer,” “producer,” and
“grower,” are used interchangeably and are intended to identify those persons or entities that 
qualify for the protections of the Capper-Volstead Act. 
37. 7 U.S.C. § 291.
38. 7 U.S.C. § 291.
39. 7 U.S.C. § 291.
40. Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Ass’n v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 497 F.2d 203, 214
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 999 (1974). 
41. United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 660 F.2d 192, 194 (6th Cir. 1981).
42. N. Cal. Supermarkets, Inc. v. Cent. Cal. Lettuce Producers Coop., 413 F. Supp.
984, 985-86 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff’d, 580 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
1090 (1979); Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19, 27-
29 (1962).   
43. Cape Cod Food Prods., Inc. v. Nat’l Cranberry Ass’n, 119 F. Supp. 900, 907 (D.
Mass. 1954); GVF Cannery, Inc. v. Cal. Tomato Growers Ass’n, 511 F. Supp. 711, 716 (N.D. 
Cal. 1981). 
44. Northland Cranberries, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 2d 221,
224-26 (D. Mass. 2004); In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d
1141, 1157-58 (D. Idaho 2011).
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But courts have held that the Act does not immunize all 
cooperative behavior.  The immunity does not apply to situations 
where the cooperative: (a) conspires with a non-cooperative or 
non-producer entity;
45
 (b) enrolls non-farmers as members;
46
 (c) 
engages in predatory conduct;
47
 or (d) monopolizes to such an 
extent that prices are unduly enhanced.
48
  Additionally, Section 2 
of the Capper-Volstead Act authorizes the Secretary of 
Agriculture to obtain a cease and desist order if he finds that an 
association has monopolized or restrained trade to such an extent 
that the price of any agricultural product is unduly enhanced.
49
 
III. THE EXEMPTION UNDER ATTACK
One of the principal challenges in advising farmers and their 
cooperatives, and in litigating the applicability of the Capper-
Volstead exemption, is the paucity of case law interpreting the 
statute.  Since its enactment in 1922, there have been less than 
250 cases that involve the Capper-Volstead Act, while there have 
been tens of thousands of cases dealing with the Sherman Act, a 
statute that is only thirty-two years older.
50
   
This dearth of case law has provided plaintiffs with plenty of 
opportunities to chip away at the exemption.
51
  This is especially 
true given the evolution and complexity of modern agricultural 
cooperatives. 
Some of the more recent challenges to the Capper-Volstead 
Act include the following: 
The inadvertent inclusion of a non-farmer in the cooperative. 
Under certain circumstances, a cooperative can lose its antitrust 
45. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 204-05 (1939).
46. Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 822-24, 826-29 (1978).
47. Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass’n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 463, 465-67
(1960). 
48. Id. at 462; see also 7 U.S.C. § 292.
49. Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass’n, 362 U.S. at 462; 7 U.S.C. § 292.
50. At the time of publication, there were only 222 cases dealing with the Capper-
Volstead Act (7 U.S.C. § 291) and 19,321 dealing with the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1). 
51. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has also publicly stated that
the Capper-Volstead Act should be narrowly construed and applied in only limited 
circumstances.  See, e.g., Statement of Int. on Behalf of the U.S. at 13, Sitts v. Dairy Farmers 
of Am., Inc., Case No. 2:16-cv-00287-cr (D. Vt. July 27, 2020). 
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immunity if its membership includes non-farmers.
52
  But many 
farming operations are family-owned and utilize different 
corporate entities for various aspects of the business, such as one 
entity devoted to the farming operation while another is devoted 
to processing the product.  What happens if the owners of the 
various agricultural businesses inadvertently had one of their non-
farming entities (e.g., a distribution company) sign the 
cooperative membership application, even though it is clear that 
their farming entities were really the intended members?  Will 
that destroy the immunity?
53
 
If the cooperative does not qualify for Capper-Volstead 
protection because it inadvertently (or negligently) includes a 
non-producer among its membership, or loses the exemption 
because of an after-the-fact determination by the judiciary on an 
issue of first impression, are the farmer-members subject to 
antitrust liability, even though they relied in good faith on the 




Given the broad statutory language protecting cooperatives’ 
ability to collectively handle, prepare for market, and market 
members’ commodities, are cooperative efforts to manage supply 
(both pre-planting and post-harvest) protected by Capper-
Volstead?  In other words, while it is clear that farmer-members 
can fix prices for their products sold through the cooperative, can 
the cooperative and its members collectively decide on pre-
production (pre-planting for crops or culling practices for 
livestock) strategies to manage and reduce supply?
55
  What about 
collectively managing post-production supply?
56
 
While cooperative members must be farmers, does the Act’s 
protection extend to cooperatives and cooperative members with 
value added (vertically integrated) operations?
57
  In other words, 
if a tomato farmer is part of a tomato grower’s cooperative but the 
farmer also has a processing plant that produces tomato juice from 
52. Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 828-29 (1978).
53. See infra Part III.A.
54. See infra Part III.B.
55. See infra Part III.C.
56. See infra Part III.C.
57. See infra Part III.D.
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its harvested tomatoes, does the fact that the farmer also has these 
processing capabilities destroy its status as a “farmer,” thus 
robbing the cooperative, and all the other members, of the Act’s 
protections?
58
  The same question applies to vertically integrated 
cooperatives as well. 
Finally, when does an entity qualify as a farmer?
59
  
Understandably, if a company simply distributes or processes 
agricultural products and engages in none of the traditional 
farming operations, the entity would not have a valid claim to 
farmer status.  But, what if it owned the land and simply leased it 
out to another entity that raised the crops or livestock?
60
  
Conversely, is a sharecropper a farmer?
61
  What if the entity did 




A. Inadvertent Inclusion of a Non-Farmer: Will an Honest
Mistake Destroy the Exemption? 
The district court in In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser 
Antitrust Litigation said yes.63  In that case, plaintiffs alleged that 
a cooperative and its members conspired to fix and raise the price 
of mushrooms while also engaging in activities that reduced the 
number of mushrooms produced nationally.
64
  One of the 
“members” of the mushroom cooperative was a produce 
distributor, which was owned by several family members.
65
  
These same family members also owned a mushroom farm and 
another related company.
66
  The two non-farm companies neither 
farmed the land nor grew the mushrooms.
67
  The family intended 
to enroll the mushroom growing company as the member, but by 
mistake, the cooperative membership agreement was signed by 
58. See infra Part III.D.
59. See infra Part III.E.
60. See infra Part III.E.
61. See infra Part III.E.
62. See infra Part III.E.
63. In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 621 F. Supp. 2d 274, 278-79,
286 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
64. Id. at 279.
65. Id. at 278.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 278-79.
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one of the non-grower companies.
68
  In a 2009 decision, the 
district court denied the cooperative’s motion for summary 
judgment, and granted the plaintiffs’ cross motion for summary 
judgment, on the issue of Capper-Volstead immunity.
69
  The court 
rejected defendants’ argument that the mistaken designation of 
the non-farmer member was a “de minimis exception” and held 
that “the existence of even one non-farmer member in an 
agricultural cooperative is sufficient to destroy Capper-Volstead 
immunity.”
70




The courts in In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust 
Litigation and In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litigation, 
accepted that a non-farmer’s membership in a cooperative will 
destroy the Capper-Volstead exemption.
72
  That viewpoint is 
based on a strict reading of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
National Broiler Marketing Association v. United States, where 
the Court denied immunity to a cooperative in which a very small 
number of its approximately seventy-five members were not 
traditional farmers or producers.
73
  The court stated: “a 
cooperative organization that includes [non-farmers]—or even 
one of them—as members is not entitled to the limited protection 
of the Capper-Volstead Act.”
74
 
But subsequent courts did not take such a black and white 
approach to the issue and limited National Broiler Marketing 
Association to its particular facts.  In fact, just four years after 
National Broiler Marketing Association was decided, the Eighth 
Circuit employed a more nuanced approach.
75
  In Alexander v. 
National Farmers Organization, the cooperative had several non-
producers who paid membership dues that were functionally 
equivalent to donations.
76
  Moreover, these non-producers were 
68. In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 621 F. Supp. 2d at 284.
69. Id. at 291.
70. Id. at 285.
71. In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 655 F.3d at 164 n.4.
72. Id. at 286; In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-md-2002, 2016 WL
5539592, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2016). 
73. Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 820, 822, 827-29 (1978).
74. Id. at 828-29.
75. Alexander v. Nat’l Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1187 (8th Cir. 1982).
76. Id. at 1185-86.
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not on the Board and had no voice in the management of the 
cooperative.
77
  Under these circumstances, the court did not allow 
the non-farmer membership to destroy the exemption.
78
  The 
court reasoned that, prior to National Broiler Marketing 
Association, “it was not at all clear that careless membership 
practices would, standing alone, preclude operation of the 
exemption.”
79
  The court further characterized the non-farmer 
members in National Broiler Marketing Association as 
“essentially middlemen” and distinguished the non-farmers in the 
present case as supporters, reasoning that the “receipt of twenty-
five dollars in ‘dues’ from a handful of individuals is hardly the 
same as shielding middlemen from price-fixing liability.”
80
  Thus, 
the court ultimately held that the Capper-Volstead exemption 
immunized the cooperative’s activities, even though individuals 
unrelated to the industry had paid membership dues during the 
period.
81
   
Many years later, a district court considered whether the 
inclusion of non-producer “associate members”—who had no 
control over the cooperative’s operations—would affect 
eligibility for Capper-Volstead immunity.
82
  The court 
determined that immunity could still apply.
83
  As the court held, 
“[s]imply put, associate members with no control over an 
agricultural cooperative are not true statutory ‘members’ and do 
not strip the cooperative of its exempt status.”
84
 
Thus, it is unclear whether the mere membership of a non-
farmer, especially one who has no meaningful involvement in the 
management of a cooperative, will destroy the antitrust immunity 
a cooperative would otherwise enjoy.  And though the court in In 
re Mushroom Direct Purchasers Antitrust Litigation held that the 
inadvertent designation of the wrong company as a cooperative 
member destroyed the exemption, the reasoning and tenor of the 
77. Id. at 1186.
78. See id. at 1187.
79. Id. at 1186.
80. Nat’l Farmers Org., 687 F.2d at 1186.
81. Id. at 1187.
82. Agritronics Corp. v. Nat’l Dairy Herd Ass’n, 914 F. Supp. 814, 823-824 (N.D.N.Y.
1996). 
83. Id.
84. Id. at 824.
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two other post-National Broilers Marketing Association decision 
cited above casts doubt that other courts would reach the same 
conclusion.
85
  Indeed, in declining to rule on the interlocutory 
appeal, the Third Circuit noted “[t]here is no dispute that the 
question, whether the arguably inadvertent inclusion of an 
ineligible member strips an agricultural cooperative of Capper-
Volstead protection, is both serious and unsettled.”
86
  To date, this 
is the only appellate court decision to have even mentioned this 
specific issue. 
B. Will a “Good Faith” Belief in the Exempt Status of a
Cooperative be Enough? 
Certain grower-defendants in In re Mushroom Direct 
Purchaser Antitrust Litigation later moved the district court to 
reconsider its 2009 decision, arguing they should not lose their 
Capper-Volstead immunity simply because the cooperative or a 
fellow member made a mistake, given that they acted under a 
“good faith” belief (based on the advice of their counsel) that their 
cooperative was properly constituted.
87
  The district court rejected 
that argument, reasoning that because proof of “specific intent” is 
not required in order to establish a violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, good-faith reliance on the advice of counsel 
affirming Capper-Volstead status of the cooperative could not 
serve to defeat plaintiffs’ Section 1 claims.
88
 
The district court in In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser 
Antitrust Litigation also considered the defendants’ argument that 
the three family-owned companies, including the non-grower, 
might be considered a “single entity” incapable of conspiring 
under the Sherman Act.
89
  But the court rejected that argument as 
well, holding that “the single entity defense cannot be used to 
circumvent the Capper-Volstead Act’s requirement” that a 
85. See In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 655 F.3d 158, 162-63, 167
(3d Cir. 2011); see also Nat’l Farmers Org., 687 F.2d at 1187; Agritronics Corp., 914 F. 
Supp. at 823-24. 
86. In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 655 F.3d at 164 n.4.
87. In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 54 F. Supp. 3d 382, 391 (E.D.
Pa. 2014). 
88. Id. at 391-93.
89. See id. at 386, 388.
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cooperative can only include producer members to qualify for 
immunity.
90
  Although the district court certified its rulings on 
both the good faith and single entity issues for interlocutory 
appeal, the Third Circuit declined to hear the appeal,
91
 leaving the 
district court’s rulings to stand.   
The good-faith issue surfaced again in In re Processed Eggs 
Products Antitrust Litigation.92  In moving for summary 
judgment, one of the producer-defendants argued that a 
cooperative member’s good-faith belief that the cooperative 
qualified for Capper-Volstead immunity should be sufficient to 
protect the innocent member.
93
  The defendant argued that 
denying it the protections of the Act, despite the producer’s good-
faith belief that the cooperative qualified, would frustrate the 
entire intent of the Act and would subject producers to enormous 
liability because of the cooperative’s failure to police its 
membership rolls.
94
   
Moreover, the exemptions for both agriculture and labor 
stem from Section 6 of the Clayton Act and are akin to fraternal 
twins.
95
  Because union members enjoy protection from the 
antitrust laws based on a good-faith belief that the labor 
exemption from the antitrust laws applied to their union,
96
 the 
defendant argued that agricultural producers should be afforded 
the same right.
97
  It further argued that the focus of the good-faith 
inquiry should be on whether the farmer-member had a good faith 
90. Id. at 390-91.
91. In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 14-8135 (3d Cir. Dec. 2,
2014). 
92. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Rose Acre Farms, Inc.’s Motion for
Summary Judgment at 23-24, In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-md-2002 
(E.D. Pa. July 2, 2015), ECF No. 1238 [hereinafter Memorandum in Support of Rose Acre]. 
93. Id. at 23-25.  See also Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Rose Acre Farms,
Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 49-50, In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 
No. 08-md-2002 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 2015), ECF No. 1304 [hereinafter Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Rose Acre].  
94. Memorandum in Support of Rose Acre, supra note 92, at 28-29.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 17; see also Memorandum in Support of Rose Acre, supra note 92, at
26. 
96. See Consol. Express, Inc. v. N.Y. Shipping Ass’n, 602 F.2d 494, 520-21 (3d Cir.
1979).  See also Feather v. United Mine Workers of America, 711 F.2d 530, 542 (3d Cir. 
1983); In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 
1993).   
97. Memorandum in Support of Rose Acre, supra note 92, at 26.
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belief that its conduct was protected by the Capper-Volstead Act, 
not on whether it believed its conduct was proscribed by the 
Sherman Act.
98
   
In denying summary judgment, the court noted that nothing 
in the Capper-Volstead Act itself suggested that Congress 
intended to provide antitrust immunity based on a farmer’s good 
faith belief that the cooperative qualified for the Capper-Volstead 
protections.
99
  Interestingly, the court sympathized with the fact 
that a cooperative member could be exposed to crippling treble 
damages through no fault of its own.
100
  The court referred to the 
lack of a statutory good-faith defense as a gaping hole in the law.  
Nevertheless, it stated that, until Congress plugs the hole, 
“diligent policing by co-operative members of the membership 
rules is the only available protection.”
101
  Given that some 
agricultural cooperatives include over 10,000 members, that is 
indeed an arduous task for the cooperative’s administration.
102
 
And, as in In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust 
Litigation, the district court in In re Processed Egg Products 
Antitrust Litigation held that whether cooperative members 
believed in good faith that the cooperative was properly 
constituted was irrelevant and denied the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment on that basis.
103
  In agreement with the district 
court in In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation 
that the absence of a specific-intent requirement in the Sherman 
Act negates the existence of a good-faith defense, the district 
court in In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litigation 
described the defendants’ argument, that the focus should instead 
be on the Capper-Volstead Act, as a “distinction without a 
98. Reply Memorandum in Support of Rose Acre, supra note 93, at 52-53.
99. See In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-md-2002, 2016 WL
5539592, at *12-13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2016). 
100. See id. at *13.
101.  In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-md-2002, 2016 WL 5539592,
at *13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2016). 
102. See, e.g., Our Farmers, DAIRY FARMERS OF AMERICA [https://perma.cc/7GRX-
D94H] (last visited March 11, 2021) (Dairy Farmers of America has over 13,000 members). 
103. Id.  The court had previously held that the cooperative, United Egg Producers
(“UEP”), was not entitled to Capper-Volstead immunity because it counted at least one non-
producer as a member.  In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-md-2002,  2016 
WL 4922706, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2016). 
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difference.”
104
  Unfortunately, both courts confused “good faith” 
with intent.  It is true that the antitrust laws do not require specific 
intent to restrain trade.  But a “good faith” defense isn’t based on 
the lack of intent to violate the antitrust laws, but rather in the 
belief that the conduct is covered by the antitrust immunity 
afforded by the Act.  In other words, “specific intent” relates to 
why the defendant engaged in the conduct, while “good faith” 
simply relates to the reasonable belief that the conduct is 
immunized by the Act.  
Finally, the district court in In re Processed Egg Products 
Antitrust Litigation emphasized that exemptions from the 
antitrust laws are to be narrowly construed.  While true, the 
judiciary has accepted good faith defenses in a variety of other 
contexts.
105
 The common thread in these decisions is the principle 
that, when Congress has seen fit to create industry-specific 
antitrust immunities, innocent participants that attempt to utilize 
those immunities in good faith should not be held liable. That 
same principle supports recognizing a good faith defense to 
antitrust liability under the Capper-Volstead Act. 
C. Are Cooperative Efforts to Manage Supply Protected by
Capper-Volstead? 
As noted previously, the Act expressly permits the 
“collective[] processing, preparing for market, handling, and 
marketing” of agricultural products, and case law has extended 
the Act’s protection to price-fixing.
106
  Recent cases against 
farmer cooperatives have focused on activities that allegedly were 
designed to reduce the supply of the product, and thereby raise its 
prices, rather than a straightforward conspiracy to fix prices.  The 
allegations include: 
104. In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 2016 WL 5539592 at *13.
105. See, e.g., Feather v. United Mine Workers of Am., 711 F.2d 530, 542-43 (3d Cir.
1983) (labor); In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(Interstate Commerce Act); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 
1982) (healthcare); MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(telecommunications). 
106. 7 U.S.C. § 291; Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Ass’n v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc.,
497 F.2d 203, 214 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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In re Mushroom Antitrust Litigation: Mushroom growers’ 
cooperative allegedly purchased out-of-production mushroom 




In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litigation:  Egg 
producers’ cooperative allegedly agreed upon, and implemented, 
an animal welfare program that included measures (including 
increasing cage space provided to egg-laying hens) that were 
designed to reduce the national number of hens, and hence the 
number of eggs produced.
108
 
Edwards v. National Milk Producers Federation: Dairy 




In re Fresh and Process Potatoes Antitrust Litigation: Potato 




Though cooperatives can clearly choose when, at what price 
and even whether to sell their inventory,
111
 plaintiffs have argued, 
to some success, that the Capper-Volstead Act does not protect 
efforts to reduce supply, especially when those efforts are 
employed prior to production.
112
  In 2011, the district court in In 
re Fresh and Process Potatoes Antitrust Litigation issued an 
“advisory opinion” that Capper-Volstead does not protect pre-




In an article on the subject, Christine Varney, then Assistant 
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, outlined the 
arguments on both sides of the “production restrictions” issue and 
107. In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 514 F. Supp. 2d 683, 689 (E.D.
Pa. 2007). 
108. In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig.,851 F. Supp. 2d 867, 877-78 (E.D. Pa.
2012). 
109. Edwards v. Nat’l Milk Producers Fed’n, No. 11 Civ. 4766,  at *4 (N.D. Cal. July
19, 2012). 
110. In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1148-49
(D. Idaho 2011). 
111. In Alexander v. Nat’l Farmers Org., the court indicated that the cooperative was
permitted to withhold (destroy) products as a negotiation technique.  687 F.2d 1173, 1188 
(8th Cir. 1982).   
112. In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
113. Id. at 1152, 1154.
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noted, “Courts have not provided definitive guidance on this 




Terms used in the Capper-Volstead Act such as “preparing 
for market” can reasonably be interpreted to include planting 
decisions and collective decisions on how much to produce.
115
  
Indeed, the Fisherman’s Collective Marketing Act (“FCMA”),
116
 
an exemption for fishermen modeled on the Capper-Volstead Act 
and which uses language almost identical to the Capper-Volstead 
Act, has been interpreted to protect fishermen who agreed not to 
fish.
117
  In a Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) adjudication, 
FTC Chairman Paul Rand Dixon opined that fishermen who 
“s[at] on the beach” to create a shortage and force an increase in 
prices were found to be exempt; “Thus, so long as the members 
of a cooperative are acting pursuant to an agreement voluntarily 
entered into . . . they are to be considered a single entity for 
antitrust purposes, the same as an ordinary business corporation 
with a number of ‘divisions.’”
118
  
Logic and economic efficiency suggest that if destruction of 
harvested crops is permitted, pre-production restrictions should 
similarly be permitted
119
—prohibiting such conduct would be 
counterintuitive.
120
  Telling farmers that they can manage supply 
only after they invest their money and resources in planting a 
crop, harvesting it, and then destroying it, makes little economic 
sense and runs counter to the antitrust laws’ goals of promoting 
efficiency.  Moreover, legislative history indicates that one 
purpose of the Capper-Volstead Act was to treat cooperatives like 
single corporate entities,
121
 which, as Chairman Dixon noted in In 
114. Christine Varney, The Capper-Volstead Act, Agricultural Cooperatives, and
Antitrust Immunity, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2010, at 5. 
115. Id. at 7.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 521 .
117. In re Washington Crab Ass’n, 66 F.T.C. 45, 1964 WL 73029, at *45, *59 (July
10, 1964). 
118. Id. at *59.  Some commentators, though, have noted that the FCMA also includes
language authorizing cooperation in “catching” and “producing” fish.  Varney, supra note 
113, at 5. 
119. Varney, supra note 113, at 7.
120. Id. at 7-8.
121. See, e.g., 62 CONG. REC. 2225 (1922) (statement of Sen. Lenroot); 62 CONG. REC.
2058 (1922) (statement of Sen. Capper). 
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Those challenging Capper-Volstead immunity have 
nevertheless maintained that supply restrictions should be treated 
differently than price-fixing and are not exempt from the antitrust 
laws.
123
  First, they argue that the Capper-Volstead Act does not 
expressly provide for supply restrictions.
124
 That argument is not 
persuasive because the same is true for price-fixing.  Second, 
some argue that supply and price-fixing are not simply two sides 
of the same coin.
125
  Fixing prices at super-competitive levels may 
encourage producers to increase production, which would tend to 
decrease prices, whereas a pre-production agreement to affect 
supply has no such built-in mechanism that limits the effects of 
the alleged anticompetitive conduct.
126
  The flaw in this argument 
is that, by the laws of supply and demand, price-fixing itself can 
only be maintained when supply is reduced to meet the new, 
fixed, market-clearing price.
127
  Thus, cooperatives that have 
collectively set a price have already implicitly managed supply. 
D. Does Vertical Integration Nullify the Exemption?
The Capper-Volstead Act applies to “[p]ersons engaged in 
the production of agricultural products as farmers, planters, 
ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers . . . .”
128
  Unfortunately, 
the Act does not define these terms or otherwise give guidance as 
to who qualifies as a “farmer.”  This is important because many 
modern-day farmers, like their cooperatives, engage in other 
activities that further process the agricultural products they grow, 
raise, or harvest.
129
  The question is whether such vertical 
integration means these farmers no longer qualify for “farmer” 
122. In re Washington Crab Ass’n, 66 F.T.C. 45, 1964 WL 73029 at *59 .
123. Varney, supra note 113, at 5.
124. See, e.g., In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1141,
1154-55 (D. Idaho 2011). 
125. Id at 1156.
126. See, e.g., id. at 1156-1157.
127. Kleen Prods. LLC v. Int’l. Paper, 276 F. Supp. 3d 811, 827 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
128. 7 U.S.C. § 291.
129. See Cooperatives, NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR., [https://perma.cc/G26B-T356] (last
visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
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status under the Capper-Volstead Act.
130
  Despite precedent 
supportive of vertical integration, the argument has been raised in 
In re Mushrooms Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, In re 
Fresh & Process Potatoes, and In re Processed Eggs Product 
Litigation.   
The Supreme Court in Sunkist Growers v. Winckler & Smith 
Citrus Prod. Co., clarified that cooperatives may contain 
members who are vertically integrated.
131
  Sunkist was an 
agricultural cooperative comprised of citrus growers and other 
agricultural cooperatives that handled the advertising, packing, 
and distribution of the members’ fruit.
132
  One of the agricultural 
cooperative organizations was owned and operated exclusively 
by a number of lemon-grower associations, all of which were also 
members of Sunkist.
133
  The Court held that multiple cooperatives 
consisting of “the same growers and associations, cannot be 
charged with conspiracy among themselves.”
134
  In applying 
Capper-Volstead immunity to the entire cooperative organization, 
the Court held irrelevant that the packing, advertising, sales, and 
processing activities were completed through distinct 
divisions.
135
  The Court stated, “To hold otherwise would be to 
impose grave legal consequences upon organizational 
distinctions that are of de minimis meaning and effect to these 
growers who have banded together for processing and marketing 




In Case-Swayne Co., Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, the Supreme 
Court considered a different aspect of the vertical integration 
question.
137
  There, Sunkist, the grower cooperative, included 
members who were “packing houses” that were not actually 
owned by the citrus grower members.
138
  The Court held that 
130. See 7 U.S.C. § 291.
131. Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prod. Co., 370 U.S. 19, 21
(1962). 
132. Id.
133. Id. at 20.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 29.
136. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prod. Co., 370 U.S. at 29.
137. Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384, 386–87 (1967).
138. Id.
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“Congress did not intend to allow an organization with such 
nonproducer interests to avail itself of the Capper-Volstead 
exemption.”
139
  As a result, Sunkist was not entitled to assert the 
exemption as a defense.  Following this decision, Sunkist 
reorganized its structure and both parties moved the district court 
to determine whether the new structure brought Sunkist within the 
Capper-Volstead exemption.
140
  The new structure did not allow 
the independent packing houses to hold membership or voting 
control in the cooperative, but vertically integrated producer 
members—citrus growers that own packing houses—were still 
valid members of the cooperative entity.
141
  Under this structure, 
the district court held that the Sunkist cooperative was compliant 
with Capper-Volstead Act requirements.
142
  
Similarly, agency decisions have noted that cooperatives 
with vertically integrated members qualify for the exemption.
143
  
In a business review letter, the Antitrust Division stated it had no 
intention of challenging a cooperative that included members that 
not only produced vegetables but also processed them in their 
own packing houses or in packing houses owned by other 
members.
144
  The Federal Trade Commission has found that a 
cooperative in which members were involved in the growing and 
shipping of lettuce also met the requirements of the Act.
145
   
The legislative history of the Act is also instructive.  
Congress considered the issue of whether a vertically integrated 
producer would still qualify as a producer under the proposed 
legislation and appeared to conclude it would.
146
  For example, 
139. Id. at 395–96.
140. Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 408, 409 (D. C.D. Cali.
1971). 
141. Id. at 414–15.
142. Id. at 415.
143. Business Review Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice issued to Texas Produce
Marketing Cooperative (Mar. 17, 1988). 
144. Id.
145. See In re Cent. Cal. Lettuce Producers Coop., 90 F.T.C. 18, 1977 WL 288550 at
*15-16 (Administrative Law Judge determining that the organization met the structural and
organization requirements of Section 6 of the Clayton Act and the Capper-Volstead Act but
ruling against the cooperative on price-fixing); In re Cent. Cal. Lettuce Producers Coop. 1977
WL 288550 at *33 (Commissioners setting aside decision on price-fixing and dismissing
complaint).  See also N. Cal. Supermarkets, Inc. v. Cent. Cal. Lettuce Producers Coop., 413
F. Supp. 984, 985-986 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
146. 62 CONG. REC. 2121 (1922) (statement of Sen. Pomerene).
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Senators Walsh and Pomerene recognized that vertically 
integrated producers/processors could join with other farmers.
147
  
In later remarks, Senator Walsh recognized that, under both 
proposed bills, the association: 
[M]ust be an organization of the producers themselves of the
product of the farm.  [The producers] may engage in
marketing that product or they may engage in processing it
for the purpose of putting it upon the market, but the
proposed legislation would exclude a combination of
producers of condensed milk who do not themselves produce
it.148
Furthermore, one stated purpose of the proposed legislation 
was to bring farmers and consumers closer together.
149
  Vertical 
integration would, in theory, eliminate at least one of the 
middlemen and improve producer returns.   
Attacks on vertical integration persist, however, based 
primarily on remarks by Justice Brennan in his concurring 
opinion in National Broiler Marketing Association.150  There, 
Justice Brennan opined that too much vertical integration could 
convert a farmer into a “processor” or “distributor” and imperil 
the exemption.
151
  In delineating whether someone is rightfully 
considered a “farmer” and therefore enjoys antitrust immunity or 
whether she is a “processor” and lacks statutory protection, 
Justice Brennan stated the following:   
The statute itself may provide the functional definition of 
farmer as persons engaged in agriculture who are 
insufficiently integrated to perform their own processing and 
who therefore can benefit from the exemption for 
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2156 (statement of Sen. Walsh).
149. 59 CONG. REC. 7852 (1920) (statement of Rep. Morgan) (“We may safely
encourage any system that will bring the producers and consumer in closer contact; that will 
provide a more efficient and more economical system of marketing, manufacturing, 
transporting, and distributing the products of the farm.  The so-called middlemen cannot, of 
course, all be eliminated, but all unnecessary middlemen should be eliminated.  The so-called 
middlemen should not be in a position to demand excessive profits.  Our system of marketing 
should be such as will give to the farmers the greatest possible proportion of the wealth they 
produce.”) 
150. See Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n, v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 832–36, 839 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
151. Id.
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cooperative handling, processing, and marketing.  Thus, in 
my view, the nature of the association’s activities, the degree 
of integration of its members, and the functions historically 
performed by farmers in the industry are relevant 
considerations in deciding whether an association is 
exempt.152 
Two district courts have subsequently cited the Brennan 
test.
153
  In United States v. Hinote, the district court found that 
two of the alleged conspirators (one of which was a subsidiary of 
ConAgra) were primarily processors and thus, denied the 
exemption.
154
  In the more recent decision, In re Fresh and 
Process Potatoes Antitrust Litigation, the district court held that 
a better-developed record was necessary.
155
  No appellate court 




E. Who is a Farmer?
As discussed, only farmers qualify for the Capper-Volstead 
Act’s exemption, but the Act provides little guidance on who may 
qualify as a farmer.  In In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust 
Litigation, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, claiming 
that certain cooperative members were simply distributors, rather 
than farmers.
157
  These entities did not own the land on which the 
hens were raised, nor did they own the hens themselves.
158
  
Instead, they had a contractual relationship with companies that 
owned the egg-laying hens whereby they raised and cared for the 
hens and purchased the eggs and then packaged and resold the 
eggs.
159
  Defendants argued that because the member actively 
152. Id. at 836.
153. United States v. Hinote, 823 F. Supp. 1350, 1355 (S.D. Miss. 1993); In re Fresh
& Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1153 (D. Idaho 2011). 
154. Hinote, 823 F. Supp. at 1359.
155. In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
156. In its Statement of Interest in the Sitts case, the Antitrust Division suggested that
if the challenged conduct was being pursued by the defendant in its capacity as a “handler or 
processor,” then immunity should not be available.  Statement of Int. on Behalf of the U.S. 
supra note 51, at 8. 
157.  In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-md-2002, 2016 WL 4922706,
at *1, *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2016). 
158.  Id. at *2.
159. Id.
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managed the egg production at the farms from which they 
purchased the eggs and were deeply involved in the husbandry of 
the hens, they qualified as a “farmer.”
160
   
In holding that the member did not qualify for farmer status, 
the court in In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litigation161 
court cited National Broiler Marketing Association,162 saying the 
“Court held that members of a cooperative which neither owned 
breeder flocks nor hatcheries and maintained no grow-out 
facilities where flocks to which they had titled were raised, could 
not be considered ‘farmers’ for purposes of the Act.”
163
  The court 
went on to hold that because the member did not own any of the 
farms where its eggs were produced, “this arrangement is 
indistinguishable from a preplanting contract, which the Court in 
National Broiler held was not the kind of investment Congress 
intended to protect under Capper-Volstead.”
164
 
Ownership of the farmland is certainly a factor in 
determining “farmer” status.  It makes little sense, though, to 
allow ownership of land to be the sole criteria in this 
determination, which would exclude leasehold farmers and 
sharecroppers, while ignoring traditional farming activities such 
as husbandry of livestock.   
IV. BARGAINING POWER–THEN AND NOW
The question can fairly be asked: Has the Capper-Volstead 
Act outlived its usefulness?  After all, many agricultural 
cooperatives are big businesses nowadays.
165
  Indeed, plaintiffs 
in the cases challenging the application of the Capper-Volstead 
Act make this argument, both implicitly and explicitly.
166
 
The fact remains that agriculture is different from other 
industries.  Production of agricultural products has a far longer 
160. Id. at *13.
161. See In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 2016 WL 4922706, at *5.
162. See Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 827-28 (1978).
163. In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 2016 WL 4922706, at *5.
164. Id. at *5.
165. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ERS, FARMING AND FARM INCOME,
[https://perma.cc/USU6-X8YS] (last visited Nov. 2, 2018). 
166. Transcript of Oral Argument at 268, In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
No. 08-md-2002 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
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lead time than its manufactured counterparts, due to the need for 
planting and harvesting, in the case of crops, or birthing and 
rearing animals, in the case of livestock.
167
  Additionally, Mother 
Nature, always a fickle variable, plays a huge role in the success 
or failure of any year’s yield.  And, of course, these products are 
generally perishable.  Given that these products form the very 
basis of the foodstuffs we consume daily, agriculture has always 
enjoyed special legislative protection.   
Nevertheless, it was the imbalance in bargaining power 
between the buyers of the agricultural products and the individual 
farmers who produced them that spurred the passage of the 
Capper-Volstead Act.  And, though agricultural producers have 
grown in size, so have their customers, resulting in the same 
relative imbalance today. 
In the early 1920s, when the Capper-Volstead Act was under 
consideration, there were approximately 6,448,000 farms in the 
United States.
168
  These were small farms that often found 
themselves at the mercy of middlemen and buyers due to a lack 
of bargaining power and the perishable nature of their products.
169
  
As farm prices became depressed, farmers were abandoning their 
farms to move to cities.  Consumers and legislators were 
concerned about potential food shortages.  The power of the 
buyers over the individual farmers impelled the passage of the 
Act.
170
   
The modern era has been marked by the consolidation of 
buyers and farm units alike.  As the Department of Justice was 
conducting a series of workshops into antitrust issues affecting 
agriculture, food retail, and processing companies continued 
along a path of rapid consolidation.
171
  By 2009, the top food 
167. Cf. Brian Scott, Planting is over. Now what do farmers do?, THE FARMER’S LIFE
(June 6, 2015, 12:57 PM), [https://perma.cc/FQ9Z-TBK8]. 
168. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FOURTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES 
TAKEN IN THE YEAR 1920, AGRICULTURE vol. 5, 24. 
169. In the Sixty-seventh Congress, Senator Lenroot stated, “[W]e are justified in
enacting this legislation which will enable the farmers of this country to put themselves 
somewhat nearer an equality of bargaining power and control of output in production that 
other industries have to-day.” 180. 62 CONG. REC. 2225 (1922) (statement of Sen. Lenroot). 
170. Alison Peck, The Cost of Cutting Agricultural Output: Interpreting the Capper-
Volstead Act, 80 MO. L. REV. 451, 497 (2015). 
171. Consolidation and Buyer Power in the Grocery Industry, FOOD & WATER
WATCH (Dec. 2010), [https://perma.cc/G7PP-M6JY]. 
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retailers—Wal-Mart, Kroger, Costco, and Supervalu—controlled 
more than half of all grocery sales in the United States.172  
Consolidation has thus given top retailers considerable 
purchasing power as wholesale buyers of groceries, and many 
food-processing firms justify their mergers as an effort to create 
stronger bargaining power with these large retailers.173 The 
number of farmers has declined by over two-thirds, from nearly 
6.5 million in the 1920s, to 2.06 million in 2016.174  At the same 
time, cooperatives have consolidated into larger units and their 
customers have become national and international enterprises.175  
In 2010, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) and 
Department of Justice held a series of workshops (“Workshops”) 
around the country entitled “Exploring Competition Issues in 
Agriculture.”176  At the June 25, 2010 Workshop in Madison, 
Wisconsin, Robert Cropp, Professor Emeritus of Agriculture and 
Applied Science at the University of Wisconsin, presented data 
indicating that the bargaining power imbalance that the Capper-
Volstead Act was designed to correct is just as prevalent today, if 
not more so.177  For example, in 2010, Wal-Mart topped the 
Fortune 500 list with food revenues of approximately $230 
billion.178  By contrast, total revenue of all dairy cooperatives in 
the country was less than $40 billion, with the largest dairy 
cooperative having sales of $10 billion.179  In 2010, the largest 
agricultural cooperative, CHS, Inc., had revenues of $26 
billion.180  A number of their customers are on the Fortune 500 
list, including Kroger, SuperValu, and Kraft.  Each of these 
172. Id.
173. Id.
174.  U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., FARMS AND LAND IN FARMS
2016 SUMMARY (Feb. 2017) at 4. 
175. Andrew Grant, Five trends and their implications for agricultural coops,
MCKINSEY (2012), [https://perma.cc/2M89-3SQ3]. 
176. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department and USDA to Hold
Public Workshops to Explore Competition Issues in the Agriculture Industry (Aug. 5, 2009), 
[ https://perma.cc/JD7A-E8ZG]. 
177. Transcript of Record at 191:9-198:5, U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
Dairy Workshop: A Dialogue on Competition Issues Facing Farmers in Today’s Agricultural 
Marketplace (June 25, 2010), [https://perma.cc/H4ST-78M5]. 
178. Id. at 193:3-6.
179. Id. at 193:12-19.
180. Id. at 193:7-11.
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entities have revenues that are large multiples of those of the 
largest cooperatives.181 
Furthermore, there has been a great deal of consolidation in 
the retail grocery industry.  Progressive Grocer’s Super 50 list of 
the largest grocery chains does not include membership clubs 
such as Sam’s, Costco, and BJ’s.182  Yet, as reported in May 2018, 
the combined annual sales of the Super 50 grocers still tops $580 
billion.183  The top ten, which includes Wal-Mart, Kroger, and 
Safeway, accounts for more than seventy-seven percent of those 
sales, or approximately $450 billion.184  Similarly, Associated 
Wholesale Grocers, a buying group not even included in the 
Super 50, had revenues of approximately $9.2 billion in 2016.185  
In comparison, according to a study by the USDA, combined 
revenues of all United States agricultural cooperatives topped 
$212 billion and the one hundred largest agricultural cooperatives 
in the United States reported combined revenues of $146 billion 
in 2015—a fraction of the combined revenue of just the top ten 
retail grocers.186  Just as they were ninety-nine years ago, today’s 
farmers are still confronted with the disproportionate bargaining 
power of their huge customers. 187  Consequently, the very 
conditions that compelled passage of the Capper-Volstead Act 
back in 1922 prevail today.   
181. Id. at 193:15-17.
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187. Just recently, the Center for Science in the Public Interest, a consumer advocacy
group, requested that the Federal Trade Commission investigate the grocery retail industry 
with respect to a number of practices.  As one example of the retailers’ power, the group 
claims that the practice of charging trade promotion fees prevents farmers from being able 
to locate their products in prime store locations. Hon. Rebecca Slaughter, et. al., Request to 
Investigate Trade Promotion, Category Captain, and Online Retail Practices in the Grocery 
Retail Industry, CENTER FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Feb. 19, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/6GYV-YE93] 
28 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  74:1 
V. IMPACT ON FOREIGN LAW
The United States is not the only country to have adopted an 
agricultural policy designed to afford certain protection to 
farmers; under the European Union’s common agricultural 
policy, certain behavior and practices by agricultural producer 
organizations, which might otherwise be considered as 
anticompetitive, are excluded from the scope of the European 
Union’s competition rules.
188
  It is not surprising, therefore, that 
current attempts to undermine and weaken the American farmers’ 
antitrust exemption could easily have international implications.  
Numerous foreign countries already use the United States’ 
antitrust law as a model, and several have adopted antitrust 
exemptions for agricultural cooperatives similar to the Capper-
Volstead Act.
189
  Farmers in developing economies have faced or 
will eventually face the same challenges as those that confronted 
American farmers at the time the Capper-Volstead Act was 
passed.
190
  They deserve the same protection.  Their governments 
could easily adopt restrictive rulings from United States courts,
191
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which could keep their farmers from achieving effective 
collective bargaining power.   
International efforts have been underway to aid the 
development of farmer cooperatives and the laws that protect 
their activities.  In a May 2012 report, the European Competition 
Network (“ECN”) noted concerns about price volatility and 
competitiveness in food production and distribution.192  Some 
national competition authorities believe that cooperation among 
producers and the creation of cooperatives would increase 
competition in the food sector.193  By 2013 these concerns led to 
the European Union’s adoption of significant reforms to its 
Common Agricultural Policy (the “CAP”) that set new rules for 
allowing joint-selling by producers in the agricultural sector.194  
In November 2015, the European Commission adopted 
guidelines on potential competition issues arising in the 
implementation of these new rules as they pertain to the olive oil, 
beef and veal, and arable crops sectors.195  CAP reform removed 
production restraints to encourage farmers to base their 
production decisions on market signals.196  The legal framework 
(1970) Ltd., 2007NLTD167 at para. 24 (N.L. Sup. Ct.–Trial Div.) (describing Canada’s 
Competition Act as creating a “partial rule of reason” by way of analogy to United States 
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under CAP reform also “extend[ed] the possibility for collective 
bargaining (in some [agricultural] sectors) and delivery contracts 
(for all [agricultural] sectors) to [p]roducer [o]rganisations, their 
[a]ssociations and Inter Branch Organisations.”
197
The U.S. Overseas Cooperative Development Council 
(funded by USAID) is conducting a major initiative called the 
“Cooperative Law and Regulation Initiative” (“CLARITY”).
198
  
Part of that initiative involves providing assistance to help 
national cooperative movements organize themselves, and 
helping to evaluate and improve their cooperative laws.
199
  
CLARITY points to the Capper-Volstead Act as an exemplar for 
implementing exemptions from competition law that would 
otherwise prohibit certain joint action between businesses for 
cooperatives.
200
   
VI. CONCLUSION
The more things change, the more they stay the same.  As 
true now as it was in the 1920s, the number of farms continues to 
decline.  Farmers and their cooperatives are still at the mercy of 
power buyers, Mother Nature, and the international marketplace.  
There is still a large imbalance of bargaining power.  In short, the 
same conditions and concerns that existed at the time the Capper-
Volstead Act was passed continue to this day.   
As the Supreme Court stated in Maryland and Virginia Milk 
Producers Association v. United States: 
We believe it is reasonably clear from the very language of 
the Capper-Volstead Act, as it was in § 6 of the Clayton Act, 
that the general philosophy of both was simply that 
individual farmers should be given, through agricultural 
cooperatives acting as entities, the same unified competitive 
197. Id. at 5 n.7.
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advantage–and responsibility–available to businessmen 
acting through corporations as entities.201 
That rationale continues to apply today.  Nevertheless, 
power buyers and other opportunistic interests continue to enlist 
the courts in eroding the basic foundations of the exemption, and 
the implications will have far reaching effects.  The bargaining 
power and economic viability of farmers and their cooperatives 
will be undermined here and abroad as foreign governments and 
their courts follow the lead of the United States.  Aggressive legal 
attacks on the very foundations of cooperatives themselves are 
being waged and hope now rests with the higher courts or 
Congress. 
201. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass’n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 466
(1960). 
